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Some commentators have worried that Descartes‘s ontological proof is a kind of 
afterthought, redundancy, or even embarrassment. Descartes has everything 
needed to establish God as the ground of certainty by Meditation Three, so why 
bother with yet another proof in Meditation Five? Some have even gone so far as 
to doubt his sincerity.1 Past literature on this topic is of daunting variety and 
magnitude, dating back to the seventeenth century.2 The current discussion has 
focused on Descartes‘s premises in relation to the coherence of his concept of 
God.3 I wish to take up this issue from a somewhat different tack, showing that 
                                                 
1 See the discussion in Donald Sievert, ―Essential Truths and the Ontological Argument: Cartesian 
Reflections on Recent Discussions,‖ Southwest Philosophy Review VI, no. 1 (1990); S.K. Wertz, 
―Why is the Ontological Proof in Descartes‘s Fifth Meditation?‖ Southwest Philosophy Review, VI, 
no. 2 (1990), 107-09. The standard work questioning Descartes‘s sincerity is Hiram Caton, The 
Origin of Subjectivity (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,1973), which argues that 
any discussion of God in Descartes is really part of an elaborate philosophical burlesque that he 
was forced to go through in order to make his work approvable to the authorities. Ironically, 
Caton‘s own book is itself a philosophical burlesque, designed to highlight the philosophical 
difficulties of post-Cartesian philosophy. See the review by Charles E. Marks, The Philosophical 
Review 84 (1975): 457-460. 
2 See Jonathan Barnes, The Ontological Argument (Macmillan: St. Martin‘s Press, 1972); John 
Hick and Arthur McGill, eds., The Many-Faced Argument: Recent Studies on the Ontological 
Argument for the Existence of God (London: Macmillan, 1968). 
3 Edwin Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1991); idem, ―Back to the Ontological Argument,‖ in Christina Mercer and Eileen O‘Neill, eds., 
Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 46-64; idem, ―Analysis in Meditations: The Quest to Clear and Distinct Ideas,‖ in Amelie 
Rorty, ed., Essays on Descartes’ Meditations (Berkely: University of California Press, 1986), 153-
76; Jean-Luc Marion, ―The Essential Incoherence of Descartes‘s Definition of Divinity,‖ in ibid., 
297-338.  The consequences of Marion‘s position are spelled out in Jean-Luc Marion, Sur la 
théologie blanche de Descartes, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981), and idem, Sur 
l’ontologie grise de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1981). The literature on Descartes‘s ontological 
argument is almost hopelessly extensive. For more recent work see the entry in Jean-Robert 
Armogathe and Vincent Carruad, eds., Bibliographie Cartesienne 1960-1996 (Lece: Conte, 2003). 
Older material may be found in Gregor Sebba, Bibliographia Cartesiana: A Critical Guide to the 
Descartes Literature, 1800-1960 (The Hague: Martinus Nijoff, 1964). The most cogent and 
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Descartes‘s ontological proof actually involves a subtle change in the direction of 
his argument from a reflective to a recollective theory of innateness. In the Fifth 
Meditation, Descartes does not simply expand on his previous discussion of God, 
which arose out of reflection on his self; rather, the ontological proof depends on 
a kind of recollection of God‘s being that could only be based on the causal 
positivity, or ―power,‖ of His existence. God is the structural cause of our idea of 
him and thereby restricts the way in which we may think of Him, in the same 
way as the essence of a triangle structurally determines the ways we must think 
of it.4 We are not free to construct such ideas in any way we want, so there must 
be a cause, or a reason, that restricts such construction.  
The specific argument of Meditation Five, however, must be understood 
in its larger context, for part of the structurally determined idea of God contains 
necessary existence, which Descartes interprets in terms of causal power. In the 
process of explaining this causal power, first to Caterus and, later to Arnauld, 
Descartes develops a way of interpreting God‘s causal relationship to himself, in 
terms of a scholastic distinction between God as causa sui and ens a se, which 
preserves the universality of the causal principle and allows us to understand why 
God can be considered as the formal cause of His own being—the self-grounding 
ground of all existence—an idea of subsequent importance to Malebranche and 
Spinoza, among others. Understanding this position on God and cause allows us 
to see a complementarity between Mediations III and V that has previously been 
overlooked.5 While the principle of eminent causality found in Meditation Three 
is central to the structural causation argument of Meditation Five, it is God‘s 
power, the positivity of His causal relationship to himself, that allows the 
argument from his effects to his existence in the first place.  
The dualistic structure to Descartes‘s arguments for God‘s existence in 
Meditations Three and Five mirrors Anselm‘s approach in the Monologion and 
the Proslogion. Appreciating this stylistic debt is crucial for understanding 
Descartes‘s attempts to improve on Anselm‘s arguments, as well as his attempt to 
truly ground all knowledge in the certainty of God‘s existence. Yet while 
Anselm‘s dual argument is ultimately based on a negative intuition of God‘s 
being, described in the Monologion as that without which the world cannot be, 
Descartes‘s dual argument in Meditations Three and Five is based on a positive 
intuition or recollection of God‘s being as a necessary structural restriction on 
                                                                                                                         
overlooked contribution to the whole debate is by Beatrice Rome, ―Created Truth and Causa Sui in 
Descartes,‖ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17 (1956): 66-78.  
4 That the ontological argument is a causal argument has been suggested previously by Robert 
Imlay (―Descartes‘ Ontological Argument,‖ New Scholasticism 43 [1969]: 440-48), but Imlay says 
that this makes the proof in Meditation Five identical to the proof in Meditation Three, overlooking 
the different kinds of innateness involved in each case. See too the discussion by J.M. Humber, 
―Descartes‘ Ontological Argument as Non-Causal,‖ New Scholasticism 44 (1970): 449-59; Imlay‘s 
reply, Robert Imlay, ―Descartes‘ Ontological Argument: A Causal Argument,‖ New Scholasticism  
45 (1971): 348-51; and the discussion by R.D. Hughes, New Scholasticism 49 (1975): 473-85. 
5 Genevieve Rodis-Lewis, ―On the Complementarity of Meditations III and V: From the ‗General 
Rule‘ of Evidence to ‗Certain Science,‘‖ Amelie Rorty, Essays on Descartes’ Meditations. 
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our concepts of the world. The ontological proof is primarily based on this 
recollective theory of innateness. It is God as causa sui, recollected as the 
necessary ground of all things, that is the sole efficient cause of the existence of 
every finite, limited thing—especially human beings and their clear and distinct 
ideas.  
 
Background to the Ontological Argument 
 
Anselm provided the original form of the ontological argument in 1077 or 1078. 
In the preface to the Proslogion, he claims that he has discovered ―a single 
formula which needs no other to prove itself but itself alone, and which by itself 
suffices to establish that God truly is, and that he is the greatest good needing no 
other, and that which everything else needs if it is to be and be well, and 
whatever else we believe about divine being.‖6 The argument generated a brief 
controversy amongst the monks when Gaunilo replied, but it lay fallow till the 
13th century when Aquinas revived it only to disprove it. This also made it 
unpopular. Then in the 17th century Descartes discovered a proof for the 
existence of God that is plainly similar to Anselm‘s, and controversy over the 
Cartesian philosophy eventually culminated in Kant, who labelled the whole 
argument ―ontological,‖ and allegedly closed the case with the claim that 
―existence is not a predicate‖—though in fact this criticism was first raised by 
Gassendi in the Fifth Set of Objections.7 According to Collingwood, Hegel 
revived the case, and from there it has been taken up in the 20th, and now the 21st, 
century.8 
The argument has clearly taken on a life of its own, quite apart from the 
intentions of its original formulator. In fact, as Marion has pointed out, in its 
original form the argument cannot be considered ―ontological‖ at all.9 Anselm 
claims in the Monologion that the mind has an intuition of a wholeness that 
cannot be captured in any finite category and especially within the categories of 
                                                 
6 Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, edited with an introduction by Brian Davies and G.R. 
Evans (Oxford/Toronto : Oxford University Press, 1998), 93, 6-10. 
7 Charles Adam, ―Biographie de Descartes,‖ vol. VII, René Descartes, Oeuvres, Charles Adam and 
Paul Tannery, eds., 13 vols (Paris: Leopold Cerf, 1897-1913), 323. I also cite the standard English 
translation of Descartes by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony 
Kenny, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), vol. II, 224.  
8 R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Philosophical Method: Revised Edition with The Metaphysics of 
F.H. Bradley, The Correspondence with Gilbert Ryle, Method and Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2005). See too the discussion by Gilbert Ryle, ―Mr. Collingwood and the Ontological 
Argument,‖ in  Hick and McGill, The Many-Faced Argument, 137-51. Ryle returns to the topic in, 
―Back to the Ontological Argument,‖ Mind  46, no. 181 (1937): 53-57, which is a reply to Errol 
Harris‘s defense of Collingwood, ―Mr. Ryle and the Ontological Argument.‖ Curley is obviously 
referencing Ryle by using a similar title. For the history of the topic see Barnes, The Ontological 
Argument, 1. 
9 Jean-Luc Marion, ―Is the Ontological Argument Ontological? The Argument According to 
Anselm and its Metaphysical Interpretation According to Kant,‖ Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 30 (1992): 201-18. 
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cognitional or contingent being. The historical context to this claim is given by 
the influence of Christian neo-Platonism and Augustine‘s reworking of the neo-
Platonic One in particular. It is not so much that Anselm was trying to prove God 
as he was trying to provide his fellow monks with a way of thinking about God. 
This makes the whole question of what fallacy the argument commits somewhat 
beside the point. His position is really the restatement of a claim basic to any 
kind of Platonism: that there is an intuition of unity prior to the duality of self and 
the world that cannot be brought into existence by reason because reason in fact 
depends upon it. Nor can this unity be simply a ―mental‖ as opposed to a ―real‖ 
concept because unity itself grounds this distinction: the intuition of unity is the 
self-grounding whole within which all thought moves. It is neither ―thought‖ nor 
―being‖ but the first principle presupposed by this distinction. Thus, according to 
Plato, the Good whose revealing activity unites the knowing with the real is the 
beginning and end of all philosophical reflection. In Derridean terms, it might be 
thought of as différance: that which allows difference as difference to appear and 
so is unrepresentable as difference. Much of the discussion of Anselm‘s 
―argument‖ is thus beside the point. 
Anselm‘s position is based on an intuition rather than an argument, his 
whole point is that it is impossible to conceive of its denial.10 The position cannot 
be opposed except philosophically, that is, through reason, and this is to grant the 
point in attempting to think the world as a whole–which is what Gaunilo did not 
realize. Gaunilo is in fact the first to think that Anselm is offering an argument 
for God that treats existence as a predicate, as we can see by his counter-example 
of the perfect island. But Anselm‘s discussion is an ―argument‖ only in the 
negative sense that he is trying to show what we must affirm by pointing to the 
impossibility of doing otherwise: it can be expressed discursively only in the 
form of a negative demonstration. We cannot not conceive of God in conceiving 
the world. God has necessary existence in this sense of a negative intuition. The 
argument is thus not concerned with finding a bridge from a concept to a thing in 
the world, but rather with showing how this opposition itself depends on 
something more fundamental. The difference between concept and thing vanishes 
in Anselm‘s intuition of the infinite One or the Good.  
In the Proslogion, which was actually the second part of the 
demonstration, Anselm sets out to show what follows from this necessary 
existence conceived of as ―something than which nothing greater can be 
conceived.‖ Anselm‘s argument thus begins in faith because reason must proceed 
from there. Rationality consists in recognizing in faith the permanent condition of 
the possibility of thinking. In order to proceed, reason needs faith in the fact that 
we have to believe in unity in order to achieve understanding. Ultimately, 
however, for Anselm this unity is inaccessible. God dwells in the inaccessible 
light and this inaccessibility is in fact a basic feature of the divine. The whole 
                                                 
10 I rely on Bernard Wills, ―What‘s Different in Anselm‘s Argument?‖ published in this volume of 
Analecta Hermeneutica. 
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argument thus relies on the impossibility of any adequate concept of God: God is 
such that anything greater cannot be thought, so God in fact begins where our 
conceptualization ends, and this maps the limits of our finitude. As Marion points 
out, ―Anselm aimed at a transcendent but inaccessible item only through the 
transcendental test of our cogitation,‖ or power of thinking. It is somewhat ironic 
that it was Kant who was the first to miss this critical approach and criticize 
Anselm for not being as critical—in the Kantian sense—as Kant himself was 
supposed to be.11 
Descartes certainly knew about Anselm‘s argument but seems to have 
read it in the traditional sense: once we understand the meaning of the word 
―God‖ we understand it to mean ―that than which nothing greater can be 
conceived.‖ But to exist in reality as well as in the intellect is greater than 
existing in the intellect alone. Therefore once we understand the meaning of the 
word God we understand that God exists in reality as well as in the 
understanding. Descartes sides with Aquinas about the criticism of this argument 
that all that can be validly concluded is that we understand the meaning of the 
word God to indicate something that exists in reality as well as in the 
understanding. But this by itself does not mean that God exists.12  
Descartes‘s argument in Meditation Five is somewhat different. Here is 
his own summary, taken from the ―First Set of Replies‖: ―That which we clearly 
and distinctly understand to belong to the true and immutable nature, or essence, 
or form of something, can truly be asserted of that thing. But once we have made 
a sufficiently careful investigation of what God is, we clearly and distinctly 
understand that existence belongs to his true and immutable nature. Hence we 
can now truly assert of God that he does exist.‖13 The key aspect of this concept 
of God which makes it possible to prove his existence is supreme perfection. In 
Meditation Five, the proof of God‘s existence is not an immediate effect of the 
concept of God but arises out of consideration of God‘s essence, and particularly 
God‘s supreme perfection, which includes among other things the perfection of 
existing. This latter perfection, I argue, must be understood in terms of our innate 
idea of God‘s causal power. 
 
Innateness and Cause 
 
In the analytic narratives of the Meditations and the Discourse, the ontological 
argument follows the argument for God‘s existence from the objective perfection 
of our idea of Him; in the synthetic presentation of the ―Second Replies‖ and the 
Principles, however, the ontological argument comes first and the argument from 
objective perfection second. But Descartes‘s goals differ in each case, as he 
points out in his justification for the analytic approach in the ―Second Replies,‖ 
where he explicitly acknowledges that the structure of the Meditations was 
                                                 
11 Marion, ―Is the Ontological Argument Ontological?‖ 209. 
12 Descartes, Oeuvres, VII, 115; Writings of Descartes, II, 82. 
13 Descartes, Oeuvres, VII, 116; Writings of Descartes, II, 83. 
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dictated by the discursive requirements of his philosophical position—which 
apparently mirror his biographical development as well, if we can believe the 
Discourse.  
 Descartes‘s geometric presentation of his argument in the ―Second 
Replies‖ focuses on the universality of the causal principle and the centrality of 
God: 
 
I. Concerning every existing thing it is possible to ask what is the cause 
of its existence. This question may even be asked concerning God, 
not because he needs any cause in order to exist, but because the 
immensity of his nature is the cause or reason why he needs no cause 
in order to exist. 
II. There is no relation of dependence between the present time and the 
immediately preceding time, and hence no less a cause is required to 
preserve something than is required to create it in the first place.  
III. It is impossible that nothing, a non-existing thing, should be the cause 
of the existence of anything, or of any actual perfection in anything. 
IV. Whatever reality or perfection there is in a thing is present either 
formally or eminently in its first and adequate cause. It follows from 
this that the objective reality of our ideas needs a cause which 
contains this reality not merely objectively but formally or 
eminently.14 
 
In the Meditations, however, the causal principle is first clearly stated only in 
Meditation Three: ―Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must be at 
least as much in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause. For 
where, I ask, could the effect get its reality from, if not from the cause? And how 
could the cause give it to the effect unless it possessed it?‖15 Lest we be inclined 
to think of causality only in terms of physical bodies, Descartes‘s makes it clear 
that this principle applies not only to physical things, but also to ideas. The causal 
law ―is transparently true not only in the case of effects which possess ‗what the 
philosophers call‘ actual or formal reality, but also in the case of ideas, where one 
is considering only ‗what they call‘ objective reality.‖16 
To put it in modern terms, Descartes is arguing that the causal 
principle applies to everything, including the semantic content of our ideas.17 
Indeed, the principle of causality is central to Descartes‘s entire project. It is 
this principle, known by the ―natural light,‖ which allows him to go from the 
cogito to God as the source of our clear and distinct ideas of the world. 
Descartes thereby drew attention to the importance of the concept of causality, 
particularly with regard to the connection between causes and reasons, 
                                                 
14 Descartes, Oeuvres, VII, 165; Writings of Descartes, II, 116. 
15 Descartes, Oeuvres, VII, 41; Writings of Descartes, II, 28. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See David B. Hausman and Alan Hausman, Descartes’ Legacy: Minds and Meaning in Early 
Modern Philosophy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). 
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thereby opening a whole debate on the relationship between causality and 
explanation that has lasted till the present-day.18  
Recent scholars have questioned the validity of the causal principle, 
attributing its authority to either Descartes‘s scholastic milieu or his insincerity.19 
In a sense, however, the causal principle is constitutive of reason itself, which we 
see if we consider the ―metaphysical‖ doubt of Meditation One.20 The principles 
of reasoning never themselves fall prey to doubt; Descartes doubts only the 
objects of his understanding, not the understanding itself—hence he calls the 
doubt ―metaphysical.‖ When doubt has stripped away all these objects he is left 
with the cogito, where consciousness becomes its own object in the immediate 
certainty of self-consciousness. Everything is then built-up from there through 
Descartes‘s elaborate theory of innateness, but the causal principal is 
fundamental throughout.  
Descartes realizes that reason, in a sense, is self-validating, for a critique 
of thinking is itself thinking: no one can question reason without assuming it. The 
natural light is self-referential and innate, and Descartes sees the causal principle 
as part of this natural light: one simply cannot think except in accordance with 
certain basic principles which constitute the form of thought, and the causal law, 
along with the principle of non-contradiction, provides the two most basic forms: 
―I ask [my readers] to ponder on those self-evident propositions that they will 
find within themselves, such as ‗The same thing cannot both be and not be at the 
same time,‘ and ‗Nothingness cannot be the efficient cause of anything,‘ and so 
on.‖21 For Descartes, both the causal law and the principle of non-contradiction 
are rules of thought, and because they are nothing but the form of thinking, their 
soundness cannot in any way be questioned through thinking. As Descartes puts 
it: ―Whatever is revealed to me by the natural light for example that from the fact 
that I am doubting it follows that I exist, and so on cannot in any way be open to 
doubt. This is because there cannot be another faculty . . . capable of showing me 
that such things are not true.‖22 The causal law may, therefore, be said to be 
innate—but not in the same way as the ontological proof shows that the 
knowledge of God‘s existence is innate. The connection between these two ideas 
of innateness helps explain an unexplored side of the complementarity of 
Meditations Three and Five. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 See the discussion in Kenneth Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy: 1637-
1739 (New York: Routledge, 1999). 
19 Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Harmondsworth, England: Pelican. 
1978), 135; Louis E. Loeb, ―Was Descartes Sincere in his Appeal to the Natural Light?‖ Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 26 (1988): 377-406. 
20 See Wills, ―What‘s Different in Anselm‘s Argument?‖ 
21 Descartes, Oeuvres, VII, 163; Writings of Descartes, II, 115. 
22 Descartes, Oeuvres, VII, 39; Writings of Descartes, II, 27. 
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Meditation Three 
 
The causal principle arises out of a reflective kind of innateness: in acts of 
reflection we think of that which calls itself ―I‖ and observe that this or that is 
within us.23 It is thus in thinking of ourselves that we think of ―being,‖ 
―substance,‖ and ―number.‖ Having got these ideas from reflection on the self, 
we then extend them to all other beings. In Meditation Three, for example, 
substance, duration, and number are extended from the self to all corporeal 
things. In the Principles, Descartes refers to these ideas, along with existence, 
order, and ―possibly such other similar matters,‖ as the most general concepts we 
have, applying to all classes of real things. 
This version of innateness is based on apperception: the innate ideas of 
―thing,‖ ―thought,‖ and ―truth,‖ are clearly involved in the cogito; reflection on 
my nature as involved with the cogito also yields the idea of God, as we see in 
Meditation Three. Finally, in Meditation Four, reflection on the experiences 
leading to the cogito reveals the idea of freedom.  
This kind of innateness plays a crucial role in Descartes‘s idea of 
―intuitive induction‖ used throughout the Meditations, and which includes the 
derivation of the universals of geometry from the experience of the particular—it 
also plays a role in connection with the derivation of the universal concepts and 
principles from the cogito. The general approach is that there are some ideas 
which are implicit in our experience and consciousness, but to which we do not 
necessarily attend or render explicit. The idea of the perfect being, for example, 
is logically presupposed in my knowledge of my own imperfection. The 
perfection of God is recognized implicitly. All lack and negation presupposes the 
thing of which it is a negation. 
This reflective theory of innateness dominates the first four Meditations: 
Descartes‘s entire activity is to extract concepts like ―substance‖ and ―God‖ from 
reflection upon what I am pre-reflectively conscious of in the cogito. There is 
thus a passage from the experience of the individual to general notions and 
principles. These notions are innate in the sense that they are implicit in 
experience or consciousness. They are not prior to experience, but only prior to 
reflection on experience. So certain universal concepts such as ―thought,‖ 
―existence,‖ ―ex nihilo, nihilo fit,‖ and ―He who thinks, exists,‖ are all capable of 
being derived by intuitive induction from my experience or consciousness of any 
individual act of thinking. In that sense they are innate in everyone. 
Besides the sense experience of particulars, from which we derive the 
universals of geometry, there is also the internal experience of any individual act 
of thinking from which by a similar intuitive induction we can derive certain 
primitive notions which belong among the principles of philosophy. They are 
innate in that we find them in ourselves when we reflect on what is implicit in 
our consciousness or experience of ourselves as thinking; they are found in the 
                                                 
23 For this terminology of innate ideas, see the classic article by Robert McRae, ―Innate Ideas,‖ in 
R.J. Butler, ed., Cartesian Studies (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), 32-54. 
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mind when the mind reflects on what it is already conscious of when it thinks. 
With regard to the idea of God in Meditation Three, this is an idea that is 
imprinted on my nature. This is why reflection on the self of which I am 
conscious yields not only the idea of what I am, but the idea of God too. The two 
ideas are innate in the same sense.  
 
Meditation Five 
 
In Meditation Five, however, a different idea of innateness is used. The 
ontological argument relies on a modified theory of anamnesis, modelled on the 
innate ideas of mathematics. Descartes regards the ideas and truths of geometry 
as innate in the mind in the sense that they are logically entailed by an idea which 
is in the mind, namely, extension, without reference, however, to whether the 
idea of extension originates in sense or not. That it does actually originate in 
sense experience is irrelevant to the conception of innateness whereby the soul, 
through its ―own fixed laws,‖ the laws of logic, draws out logical consequences 
by a kind of natural illation. 
Innate knowledge in this sense is any enlargement of our knowledge 
which results from the perception of logical relationships. When these are 
interpropositional, to ―recollect‖ a previously unknown proposition is to come to 
know it by seeing that it is entailed by others already known. When the relations 
are intra-propositional, as in the case of the ―what is X?‖ question, then to 
―recollect‖ is to gain insight into the logical structure of a concept, so that when 
faced with its correct definition one will see that the concepts concerned are 
analytically connected. This idea of innateness is operative throughout 
Meditation Five, particularly with respect to the idea of God. 
By this stage in the Meditations Descartes has established the cogito, 
God‘s existence, and the truth of his clear and distinct ideas, and he is beginning 
to see what else he can let back into his thought. Sensible qualities, we know, are 
subject to the problem of material falsity. However clear they might be as ideas 
existing in the mind, they are not distinct with regard to the content they contain, 
so we cannot tell which contain objectively simple natures and which are just 
privations of those natures. To this extent our perceptions of qualities are 
confused and all our knowledge of such simple natures is cast into doubt because 
we do not know which ones are positive and which are privative. 
This is not true, however, of the simple nature of extension. It has a 
number of modes, or manners under which it may exist, like sizes and shapes, 
that assume more general ordered attributes like position and number. All manner 
of truths may be deduced from the modes of extension. From the shape of 
triangularity, for example, we can deduce Pythagoras‘s Theorem; we can ―figure 
out‖ a lot about triangles, their modes, and how they go together. 
The point about these truths is that they are not something we in any way 
invent or determine: even when we cook-up the shape we cannot do it any way 
we want. The shape must conform to certain truths: we are compelled by the 
truth itself—by the nature of the triangle which exits independently of our will. 
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The truth of these matters is so evident, states Descartes, ―that on first 
discovering them it seems that I am not so much learning something new as 
remembering what I knew before; or it seems like noticing for the first time 
things which were long present within me.‖24 Despite the fact that we invent such 
ideas in our imagination, we are compelled to put only certain things into them 
and not others by a kind of natural illation of the soul. How could this be if such 
ideas were materially false? Since we are compelled, the simple nature 
―extension‖ must be real ―something and not merely nothing.‖25  
Meditation Five thereby lays the ground for a mathematical and 
mechanical science of nature: with extension and its modes, not only do we 
clearly and distinctly perceive the existence of the ideas, but also that the simple 
natures that the ideas contain are indeed something real and positive, existing 
independently of our imagination. We not only perceive all the different modes 
of extension, but we know what goes into these modes and how they are related 
to each other in detail through the sciences of geometry and arithmetic. There is 
an objective structural necessity in certain ideas, and this objective necessity, 
writes Descartes, is equally applicable to the idea of God: ―From the fact that I 
cannot think of God except as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable 
from God, and hence that he really exists.‖ It is not that my thought makes it so, 
or ―imposes any necessity on any thing,‖ Descartes writes, ―on the contrary, it is 
the necessity of the thing itself, namely the existence of God, which determines 
my thinking in this respect.‖26 It is this positive intuition of God that ultimately 
grounds Descartes‘s whole project; such an intuition must not be understood as 
an argument, but as an immediate experience of the ground of certainty, which 
ensures the continual truth of clear and distinct ideas. It is the grounding of 
certainty in this positive intuition of God that is the essence of Descartes‘s reply 
to Arnauld about the Cartesian Circle.27 The onus is not on Descartes to prove 
God‘s existence; given the certainty of our positive intuition of Him, it is rather 
up to Arnauld to come up with an argument for doubt that would shift Descartes 
from his foundation. In the subsequent discussion of the concept of God 
Descartes attempts to understand this positive intuition in terms of causal power. 
 
Causality and the Divine Essence 
 
For Descartes, the causal principle is inseparable from reason itself in so far as it 
is constitutive of the natural light. Moreover, it has universal application, as is 
seen in the geometrical exposition in the second set of replies. The importance of 
this universality has been recognized by most commentators. Noting that ―to 
regard God as the efficient cause of himself, in any ordinary sense of the word 
‗cause‘ is . . . impossible,‖ Kemp-Smith points out that we are to see Descartes‘s 
use of the word in terms of his emphasis on the limitations of human thought in 
                                                 
24 Descartes, Oeuvres, VII, 64; Writings of Descartes, II, 44. 
25 Descartes, Oeuvres, VII, 65; Writings of Descartes, II, 45. 
26 Descartes, Oeuvres, VII, 67; Writings of Descartes, II, 46. 
27 Descartes, Oeuvres, VII, 246; Writings of Descartes, II, 171. 
11 
 
understanding the divine: Descartes, he argues, strains to apply efficient causality 
analogically to God, so as to preserve the universal applicability of the causal 
principle.28 
In the ―Fourth Set of Replies,‖ Descartes himself discusses this 
analogical use of efficient causation in terms of a sort of geometrical passage to 
the limit: 
 
All the above ways of talking, which are derived by analogy with the 
notion of efficient causation, are very necessary for guiding the natural 
light in such a way as to enable us to have a clear awareness of these 
matters. It is exactly the same sort of comparison between a sphere (or 
other curvilinear figure) and a rectilinear figure that enabled Archimedes 
to demonstrate various properties of the sphere which could scarcely be 
understood otherwise.29 
 
This focus on efficient causality is necessary for Descartes because if the causal 
principle is not applicable to God, then its universality is called into question, as 
is the entire proof of God‘s existence which is based upon it. Priority has to be 
given to the notion of efficient cause, Gilson argues, because if it is not, then the 
whole causal principle itself is called into question, and so, consequently, is the 
causal argument for God‘s existence in Meditation Three.  
The difficulty seems to be that the concept of God as causa sui cannot be 
understood in any other way except in terms of efficient causality, and God 
cannot be understood as the effect of efficient causality insofar as this would be 
contrary to his divine nature as ens a se.30 For Thomism, this divine nature lies 
within real being in actu: God is pure actuality and so cannot be in a causal 
relationship to himself. Instead God is the good towards which all things strive 
(in accordance with their nature). In aspiring to perfection, everything aspires to 
God, the final Goal and the uncaused first cause—the prima causa incausata—
which, for Aquinas, we can only speak of analogically.31  
According to Taylor, the theory of causality involved in Cartesian self-
grounding is actually neo-Platonic, and while its precise formulation comes from 
the Institutio Theologica of Proclus, Descartes certainly got it from Aquinas, who 
in turn got it from both the pseudo-Aristotelian Liber de Causis (really a 
fragment of Proclus) and the works of Dionysius. Taylor concludes: ―That 
Descartes, in his attempt to re-found philosophy should have assumed Proclus‘s 
doctrine of causation as axiomatic is as interesting an example as I know of the 
                                                 
28 Norman Kemp-Smith, New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes: Descartes as Pioneer (London: 
Macmillan, 1952), 316. 
29 AT VII, 241; CSMK II, 168. 
30 Étienne Gilson, Étude sur la Role de la Pensée Médiévale dans la formation du Système 
Cartésien (Paris : J. Vrin, 1951), 231. 
31 Aquinas, Sum. theol., 1a, q. 3, a. 7; 1a, q. 13, a. 6. 
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artificiality of the whole distinction between ‗ancient‘ and ‗modern‘ 
philosophical thought.‖32  
This neo-Platonic influence is clearly seen in the primacy of God as 
efficient cause and in the reality principle in particular—―there must be as much 
in the total and efficient cause as there is in the effect of that cause.‖ This 
principle of causality was in fact one of the major features of emanationism, 
though none of the Cartesian literature mentions this, and though it was Aquinas 
who first spelled out the pre-eminence of efficient causation and God as first 
cause, in a sense he was only making plain what was there to be read in neo-
Platonism, and in Pseudo-Dionysius in particular.33 In addition, Descartes and the 
neo-Platonic tradition, including Aquinas, share a belief in (1) a hierarchical 
universe that descends through several levels from God, or the One, which is 
beyond being, to the corporeal world (the pro-odos); and (2) the inner spiritual 
experience that enables the self to reascend through the intelligible world to the 
One (the epistrophe). This abiding-procession-return triad may be said to form 
the essential exitus/reditus structure of the Summa Theologica, but it is also 
Augustinian so Descartes probably knew it from both sources.34  
Descartes‘s work has further literary affinities with this tradition in so far 
as he played with issues of identity and formal framing, and in Pseudo-
Dionysius, as indeed in Plato, what written philosophy reduces to is a question of 
framing, of presenting structures, or limits, whereby texts may be read.35 Many 
Platonic texts, for example, are recursive and turn back on themselves, and they 
thereby raise the question of the relation of the whole to the part. They 
sometimes involve repetition, and the text often allows different points of view. 
Narratives are sometimes framed within other narratives, so sometimes it is hard 
to know where one frame ends and another begins. They are polyphonic and 
open-ended texts, and the way they are written is often an important clue to their 
meaning. Thus, for example, Pseudo-Dionysius not only assumes an identity—a 
declamation with meaning of its own --  he is always making reference to non-
existent works, as well as calling attention to the way the structure of the text 
mirrors the content. The most important structure that these writings exhibit is 
the divine structure of procession and return, of Lower and Higher Eros, which 
was first sketched out by Plato in the Symposium, developed triadically by the 
                                                 
32 A.E. Taylor, ―Review of Locke’s Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations by James 
Gibson,‖ Mind 27, no. 107 (1918): 360. 
33 For the discussion of the reality principle in Descartes, see Tad Schmaltz, ―Deflating Descartes 
Causal Axiom,‖ in Daniel Garber and Steven Nadler, eds., Oxford Studies in Early Modern 
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1-31. See Charles Dubray, ―Emanationism,‖ 
entry in The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 5 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909). 
Retrieved 10 May 2010 <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05397b.htm>. 
34 Augustine, The Magnitude of the Soul (De Quantitate Animae), trans.  John J. McMahon, in 
Ludwig Schopp, ed., Writings of Saint Augustine, vol. 2 (CIMA Publishing Co., 1947), chapters 33-
36. 
35 For similar themes in Descartes, see the discussion in Dalia Judowitz, Subjectivity and 
Representation in Descartes: The Origins of Modernity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1988). 
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neo-Platonists, and Christianized in Pseudo-Dionysius (also an important source 
for Anselm‘s negative theology). The primacy of efficient causation in 
Descartes‘s thought, and our interior return to the source of knowledge in God, 
has important precedents.  
The ancient/modern distinction has always been somewhat questionable, 
especially amongst French historians of philosophy like Gilson and Koyré, who 
concentrated on medieval and Platonic continuities in Descartes‘s thought.36 
Similarly, most current work in the history of philosophy has focused on links 
rather than breaks. Much of the recent material on causation in Descartes, for 
example, discusses the medieval background to his thought, particularly his 
Thomist views on concurrentism and divine conservation, which is related to his 
occasionalism, more fully developed by Malebranche.37 Other notions of 
causation, however, also play a significant role in Descartes‘s thought: he 
discusses primary and secondary cause, essential and accidental cause, eminent 
causation, and all four of the Aristotelian causes.38 
Misunderstandings about Descartes‘s complex concept of causation in 
God date back to the 17th century. In 1648, in the Notae in Programma, 
Descartes warns Regius that he ―never wrote that ‗God should be said to be, not 
only negatively, but positively, the efficient cause of himself,‘ as he affirms in a 
very rash and ill-considered manner in page 8 of his second pamphlet. Let him 
turn over, read, and thoroughly search my writings, he will find in them nothing 
like this, but the very reverse.‖39 
The issue first came up, however, in Caterus‘s objections to the 
Meditations, where he challenges Descartes to clarify what he meant in 
Meditation Three when he pointed out that a being which derived its existence 
―from itself‖ would be God.40 According to Caterus, this phrase can only have 
two meanings: the first, positive, sense of the phrase means ―from itself as from a 
cause.‖ Caterus implies that this surely could not be what Descartes means, for 
                                                 
36 Étienne Gilson, La Liberté chez Descartes et la théologie (Paris: Alcan, 1913); Alexander Koyré, 
Essai sur l’idée de Dieu et les preuves de son existence chez Descartes (Paris: Leroux, 1922). 
37 Roger Ariew, Descartes and the Last Scholastics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); David 
Scott, ―Occasionalism and Occasional Causation in Descartes‘ Philosophy,‖ Journal of the History 
of Philosophy 38 (2000): 503-28. 
38 See the discussion in Kenneth Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Early Modern Philosophy, 
1637-1739 (New York: Routledge, 1999). Three recent books that discuss Descartes on cause have 
reached different conclusions. Vincent Carraud, in his Causa sive ratio. La raison de la cause, de 
Suarez à Leibniz (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002), argues for the primacy of efficient 
cause in Descartes‘s thought. Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen, in Descartes and Method: 
A Search for Method in the Meditations (London: Routledge, 1999), support the primacy of formal 
cause, particularly in explanation. Stephen Gaukroger, in his Descartes: An Intellectual Biography 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), argues that Descartes allows for all four Aristotelian causes and 
only rejects our knowledge of final cause, not its existence. 
39 Descartes, Oeuvres, VIIIB 369; Writings of Descartes, I, 310. 
40 For a thorough discussion of the context of the exchange with Caterus, see Jorge Secada, The 
Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Secada 
uses the focus on formal cause to argue for an essentialist reading of Descartes where 
understanding a thing‘s essence precedes any question of its existence. 
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then the being would ―exist prior to itself so that it could choose in advance what 
it should subsequently be,‖ and this is manifestly absurd. The phrase is usually 
taken to mean, he writes, ―not from another,‖ and if this is indeed what Descartes 
means by a being that derives its existence ―from itself,‖ then ―how can we prove 
that this being embraces all things and is infinite?‖41 What Caterus‘s question 
centers on is what it means to consider God as either causa sui or ens a se, and 
Descartes‘s reply to him explains the difference. 
Causa sui means ―cause of itself,‖ which when applied to God means 
that God owes his existence to nothing other than himself.42 As Descartes uses 
the terms it does not mean that God brought himself into existence, but that the 
very nature of God logically requires that he exist. What accounts for the 
existence of a being that is causa sui is its own nature. In the ―Fourth Set of 
Objections,‖ Arnauld takes Descartes, in his reply to Caterus, to be arguing 
precisely that God‘s existence ―from himself‖ somehow implies that ―God 
somehow brought himself into existence.‖ Descartes, however, had explicitly 
rejected this idea. In the ―First Set of Replies,‖ he writes: ―Although God has 
always existed, since it is he who in fact preserves himself, it seems not too 
inappropriate to call him ‗the cause of himself.‘ It should however be noted that 
‗preservation‘ here must not be understood to be the kind of preservation that 
comes about by the positive influence of an efficient cause; all that is implied is 
that the essence of God is such that he must always exist.‖43 Which is to say that 
Descartes conceives of God as causa sui in terms of self-sustenance, as he 
himself points out to Arnauld.44 At any rate, Caterus, as we have seen, thought 
that Descartes could not have meant that God‘s existence ―from himself‖ was the 
kind of positive notion found in the idea of ―efficient cause of self.‖ This phrase 
could only be taken in the negative sense of ―not from another,‖ but then the 
problem is that we may be able to interpret the phrase in such a way that it does 
not apply only to God but also to limited things, and if this is so, then we cannot 
argue from things as effects of God, back to God as their only cause.  
According to Suarez, Caterus says, something existing from itself could 
only mean something is uncaused, and this would only apply to God, who then, 
as cause of everything else is the cause of their limitations insofar as he is 
unwilling to endow them with more greatness or perfection. Because every 
limitation proceeds from some efficient cause, we are able to trace the causal 
train back from limited finite things to God, who, as existing from himself is an 
uncaused cause. But what if, Caterus says, the phrase ―from itself,‖ meaning ―not 
from another,‖ just means that a thing‘s limitations arise from that thing‘s 
internal constitutive principles, i.e., its essence or form? That would mean that 
we could not accept the premise that every limitation proceeds from some 
efficient cause, and therefore the causal proof of the existence of the uncaused 
                                                 
41 Descartes, Oeuvres, VII, 95; Writings of Descartes, II, 68. 
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cause will not work, because then we would be unable to trace a causal chain 
back to God.45 It is the difficulty over this meaning of aseity that leads Caterus to 
question Descartes on the issue. 
The word aseity is formed from the Latin prepositional phrase ens a se, 
which means ―a being from itself‖ or a being that is self-sufficient. Since every 
created thing depends upon God for its existence, only God could be ens a se, for 
if he depended on any other being, he would not be self-sufficient. As Descartes 
will try to explain to Caterus, ens a se is to be distinguished from ens ex se. Ens a 
se is from itself and not ―out of itself‖; it does not depend on itself for its own 
existence, because it is in no way dependent.46  
Immediately after explaining causa sui to Caterus, Descartes goes on to 
point out that God‘s aseity, or existence ―from himself,‖ can be taken in a 
positive sense that eliminates the difficulties with the causal proof that arise from 
its negative sense: 
 
These consideration make it easy for me to answer the point about the 
ambiguity in the phrase ―from itself‖ which, as the learned theologian 
[Caterus] has reminded me, needs to be explained. There are some who 
attend only to the literal and strict meaning of the phrase ―efficient 
cause‖ and thus think it impossible for anything to be the cause of itself. 
They do not see that there is any place for another kind of cause 
analogous to an efficient cause, and hence when they say that something 
derives its existence ―from itself‖ they normally mean simply that it has 
no cause. But if they would look at the facts rather than the words, they 
would readily observe that the negative sense of the phrase ―from itself‖ 
comes merely from the imperfection of the human intellect and has no 
basis in reality. But there is a positive sense of the phrase which is 
derived from the true nature of things, and it is this sense alone which is 
employed in my argument.47 
According to the traditional, negative, interpretation of ens a se, it ―does not 
depend upon itself for its own existence, because it is supposed to be dependent 
on absolutely nothing.‖ If ens a se depended upon itself in a positive way, this 
could only mean that it was the efficient cause of its own existence, which is 
absurd. Given Caterus‘s difficulties with interpreting the phrase in a negative 
sense, however, Descartes is here opening up the possibility of interpreting ens a 
se in a positive sense, a cause ―analogous to efficient cause.‖ What this means is 
that God causes himself only in virtue of his power and perfection: ―There is no 
need to say that God is the efficient cause of himself, for this might give rise to a 
verbal dispute. But the fact that God derives his existence from himself, or has no 
cause apart from himself, depends not on nothing but on the real immensity of 
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his power; hence when we perceive this, we are quite entitled to think that in a 
sense he stands in the same relation to himself as an efficient cause does to its 
effect, and hence that he derives his existence from himself in the positive 
sense.‖48 
Arnauld had given Descartes a ―sombre warning‖ that ―it will scarcely be 
possible to find a single theologian who will not object to the proposition that 
God derives his existence from himself in a positive sense and as it were 
causally.‖49 Descartes, therefore, always concerned with orthodoxy, is at some 
pains to point out to Arnauld that ―this way of talking is extremely useful and 
even necessary when dealing with the topic under discussion.‖ Indeed, he writes, 
―it seems to me to be wholly innocent of any suspicion of being likely to cause 
offence.‖50 
 Descartes is aware that theologians had been wary of using the word 
―cause‖ in any discussion of God because it might lead to the idea that certain 
persons of the Trinity were inferior to others, due to some kind of causal relation. 
Descartes, however, wants only to discuss God as a unity, and consequently he 
does not see ―why the word cause is to be avoided at all costs, especially when 
we come to a context where it seems extremely useful and almost necessary to 
use the term.‖51 ―Those who follow the sole guidance of the natural light will in 
this context spontaneously form a concept of cause that is common to both an 
efficient and formal cause: that is to say, what derives its existence ‗from 
another‘ will be taken to derive its existence from that thing as an efficient cause, 
while what derives its existence ‗from itself‘ will be taken to derive its existence 
from itself as a formal cause—that is, because it has the kind of essence which 
entails that it does not require an efficient cause.‖52 
 Most people take the phrase ―from itself‖ only in the negative sense of 
―not from another,‖ which leads to the difficulty with the causal proof that is 
pointed out by Caterus. The only way to take the phrase that does not lead to 
these difficulties, Descartes argues, is precisely in the positive sense of formal 
cause. As he had pointed out to Caterus, unless the chain of efficient causes is 
traceable back to something which is in some way the cause of itself, we would 
have to go tracing the causal chain to infinity, and we could never arrive at a first 
cause.53 So the question of efficient causality is applicable to everything, and if 
we find that something has no need of an efficient cause, we may ask why it does 
not need one; if the reason it does not need one is because it derives its existence 
―from itself,‖ the only sense of ―from itself‖ that does not lead to difficulties in 
the causal proof is ―from itself‖ due to its power, perfection, and essence—that 
is, as a formal cause. Descartes writes to Caterus: ―Each of us may ask himself 
whether he derives his existence from himself in this same sense. Since he will 
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find no power within himself which suffices to preserve him even for one 
moment of time, he will be right to conclude that he derives his existence from 
another being, and that this other being derives its existence from itself.‖54 That is 
―from itself‖ in the positive sense of formal cause—which is analogous to 
efficient cause but not the same thing. The true nature of the analogy, however, 
has yet to be explained. To do this, Descartes thinks it is necessary to show: 
 
In between ―efficient cause‖ in the strict sense and ―no cause at all‖ there 
is a third possibility, namely ―the positive essence of a thing‖ to which 
the concept of efficient cause can be extended. In the same way in 
geometry the concept of the arc of an indefinitely large circle is 
customarily extended to the concept of a straight line; or the concept of a 
rectilinear polygon with an indefinite number of sides is extended to that 
of a circle. I thought I explained this in the best way available to me 
when I said that in this context the meaning of ―efficient cause‖ must not 
be restricted to causes which are prior in time to their effects.55 
 
Efficient causes are comparable to ―the positive essence of a thing,‖ or formal 
cause, insofar as in neither case does a temporal restriction apply. The restriction 
of temporal priority in relation to effect can be deleted from the concept of 
efficient cause because ―the notion of [efficient] cause is applicable only during 
the time when it is producing its effect.‖56 Both formal and efficient causes are 
comparable because they share the property of temporal coincidence with regard 
to their effects, in the same way as the arc of an infinite circle and a straight line 
share orthogonality. This example, like the one cited previously, is taken straight 
from Cusa, who also argues that in the divine coincidence of opposites all the 
attributes of God are the same. Infinite justice is the same as infinite mercy; in 
the same way as every geometrical figure reduces to every other one (―The 
Minimum is contained in the Maximum‖). Yet, for Descartes just as the arc of 
the infinite circle and the straight line are different, so are formal and efficient 
cause, insofar as a formal cause of a thing is not distinct from its effects, while an 
efficient cause is. This is why, strictly speaking, nothing can be the efficient 
cause of itself. As he points out to Arnauld if we thought of causa sui in this way: 
what gives itself existence would have to be different from itself insofar as it 
receives existence; yet to be both the same thing and not the same thing—that is, 
something different—is a contradiction.57 
In other words, this concept of efficient cause would lead to the rejection 
of what Descartes would later present in the Principles as one of the eternal 
truths of reason: ―It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the 
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same time.‖58 This is why Descartes says there is no risk of error in the analogy 
between efficient and formal cause as applied to God ―since the one feature 
peculiar to an efficient cause, and not transferable to a formal cause, involves an 
evident contradiction which could not be accepted by anyone, namely that 
something could be different from itself, or the same thing and not the same thing 
at one time.‖59 This means that, with regard to God as formal cause, insofar as 
formal cause is reflexive, God can be seen as ―the cause of himself‖ without this 
necessarily implying that ―he has any of the indignity of being an effect.‖60 God 
as formal cause of himself in the positive sense has priority. This why Descartes 
makes the final point: ―The answer to the question why God exists should be 
given not in terms of an efficient cause in the strict sense, but simply in terms of 
the essence or formal cause of the thing. And precisely because in the case of 
God there is no distinction between existence and essence, the formal cause will 
be strongly analogous to an efficient cause, and hence can be called something 
close to an efficient cause.‖61 In taking formal causality to be the whole essence 
of a thing in this way, Descartes says, he is simply following Aristotle, who calls 
it the first kind of aitia, or cause: ―[Aristotle] then extends this notion to all the 
essences of all things, since at this point he is not dealing with the causes of a 
physical compound (any more than I am in this context), but is dealing generally 
with the causes from which any kind of knowledge can be derived. It was 
scarcely possible to deal with this topic without attributing the term ‗cause‘ to 
God.‖62 
It is not so difficult for Descartes to conceive of formal cause in God 
since formal causes are usually intrinsic to that of which they are cause. But this 
does not seem to raise the same problem as the problem of efficient cause, unless 
one wants to say that the formal cause is in some sense determining of and 
therefore prior to that in which it is realised. Would this make the divine essence 
in some sense determining of the divine existence? This is the problem raised by 
the suggestion that what Anselm‘s argument supposedly would show is that if 
God exists he exists necessarily—and that of course is not enough for a fully 
ontological argument, as Aquinas points out.  
In the end, while Anselm and Aquinas cannot agree on conceptualizing 
God, they do agree that God is transcendent and, in some sense, inaccessible, 
though for different reasons. For Scotus, however, and later on for Suarez, the 
univocity of being allows us to think God under the concept of causality, so that 
even if infinitely perfect and simple, God is not inaccessible. This sets the scene 
for the arguments of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz who are all in search of a 
self-explanatory principle whose infinite perfection does not carry us beyond 
conceptual comprehension. In Descartes‘s case this causal relation is not simply a 
way of thinking about God, for it reflects a real relationship in God. Descartes 
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argues that God‘s existence and essence are conceptually distinct, but this does 
not mean that they are distinct only in reason. He clarifies the matter in one of his 
letters to an unknown correspondent. While shape and other modes are strictly 
speaking modally distinct from the substance whose mode they are, there is a 
lesser distinction between attributes such as existence and number, but this not 
mean that the distinction is merely rational or conceptual. 
Descartes, in fact, plainly states in Axiom 10 of the ―Second Replies‖ 
that existence is contained in the clear and distinct idea of every single thing.63 
God is conceptually distinct from his necessary existence, while every created 
thing is conceptually distinct from its possible or contingent existence. This is 
not, however, a mere distinction of reason, it is a conceptual distinction with a 
ground in the formal realities to which the distinction applies. This latter 
distinction can be called modal in a broad sense, as in the ―First Set of Replies,‖ 
but Descartes says ―it is perhaps better called formal.‖ To avoid confusion, he 
says, in the Principles he referred to this distinction as ―conceptual‖: ―that is, a 
distinction made by reason ratiocinatae. I do not recognize any distinction made 
by reason ratiocinantis—that is, one which has no foundation in reality—because 
we cannot have any thought without a foundation.‖64  
Descartes clarifies his argument in the reply to Arnauld: 
 
In every passage where I made a comparison between a formal cause (or 
reason derived from God‘s essence, in virtue of which he needs no cause 
in order to exist or be preserved) and the efficient cause (without which 
finite things cannot exist), I always took care to make it explicitly clear 
that the two kinds of cause are different. And I never said that God 
preserves himself by some positive force, in the way in which created 
things are preserved by him; I simply said that the immensity of his 
power or essence, in virtue of which he does not need a preserver, is a 
positive thing.65 
 
The immensity and power of God is the ―cause or reason‖ for his not needing a 
cause. Since that power is a positive thing, the ―reason or cause‖ why God needs 
no cause is a positive ―reason or cause.‖ What is operative here is a kind of 
structural causation. The cause of the reality contained by an idea is a structural 
cause that determines the idea to be of one thing rather than another. The crucial 
causal principle is that for the mind to know its thought must be adequately 
                                                 
63 ―Existence is contained in the idea or concept of every single thing, since we cannot conceive of 
anything except as existing. Possible or contingent existence is contained in the concept of a limited 
thing, whereas necessary and perfect existence is contained in the concept of a supremely perfect 
being.‖ Descartes, Oeuvres, VII, 166; Writings of Descartes, II, 117. 
64 Descartes, Oeuvres, IV, 349; Writings of Descartes, III, 280. See Justin Skirry, ―Descartes‘ 
Conceptual Distinction and its Ontological Import,‖ Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 
(2004): 121-44. Skirry is arguing against what he calls the ―standard account,‖ that Descartes‘s 
conceptual distinction is merely a distinction of reason. Rather, he argues, the idea is grounded in 
Scotus‘s distinctio formalis a parte rei. 
65 Descartes, Oeuvres, VII 236; Writings of Descartes, II, 165. 
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structured to its object. Such ideas are materially true in so far as they are of their 
object, and this is what ensures the truth of everything ―recollected‖ out of the 
idea. This is what grounds the necessity of thinking of God as the existent and 
self-causing ground of creation itself. This is why Descartes writes in Meditation 
Five that ―it is the necessity of the thing itself, namely the existence of God, 
which determines my thinking in this respect.‖66 This is a kind of positive 
intuition of God as a necessary being—as opposed to the negative intuition of 
God‘s necessary existence which we find in Anselm. Descartes‘s ―recollection‖ 
of the idea of God in Meditation Five builds on the positivity of the idea of God 
established in Meditation Three, just as Anselm‘s argument concerning necessary 
existence in the Proslogion builds on what was established negatively in the 
Monologion.  
 
Causality in Meditation Five 
 
This causal background allows us the understand Descartes‘s presentation of the 
ontological argument in Meditation Five: 
 
But if the mere fact that I can produce from my thought the idea of 
something entails that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive 
to belong to that thing really does belong to it, is not this a possible basis 
for another argument to prove the existence of God? Certainly, the idea 
of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one that I find within me just as 
surely as the idea of any shape or number. And my understanding that it 
belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct 
than is the case when I prove of any shape or number that some property 
belongs to its nature.67 
 
The existence of God thus seems to be entailed in his concept as a kind of natural 
illation or recollection, which is why Descartes talks about another way of 
proving God‘s existence, another innate idea of God distinct from reflective 
innateness: 
 
Whatever method of proof I use, I am always brought back to the fact 
that it is only what I clearly and distinctly perceive that completely 
convinces me. Some of the things I clearly and distinctly perceive are 
obvious to everyone, while others are discovered only by those who 
look more closely and investigate more carefully; but once they have 
been discovered, the latter are judged to be just as certain as the 
former. In the case of a right-angled triangle, for example, the fact 
that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the square on the other 
two sides is not so readily apparent as the fact that the hypotenuse 
                                                 
66 Descartes, Oeuvres, VII, 67; Writings of Descartes, II, 46. 
67 Descartes, Oeuvres, VII, 65; Writings of Descartes, II, 45. 
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subtends the largest angle; but once one has seen it, one believes it 
just as strongly.68 
 
Existence belongs to God‘s essence deductively because, as Descartes puts it in 
the reply to Caterus: ―When we attend to the immense power of this being, we 
shall be unable to think of its existence as possible without also recognizing that 
it can exist by its own power; and we shall infer from this that this being does 
really exist and has existed from eternity, since it is quite evident by the natural 
light that what can exist by its own power always exists. So we shall come to 
understand that necessary existence is contained in the idea of a supremely 
perfect being.‖69 
It may be thought that Descartes is equivocating between ―reason‖ and 
―cause,‖ that he continuously slides between cause-as-thing and cause-as-
proposition, where both terms of a syllogism and things can be explanatory 
causes, without drawing a sharp distinction between them.70 But this misses the 
point that, for Descartes, reasons are causes. The distinction between reason and 
cause is itself based on an empiricist distinction between sense and reason. But 
for Descartes‘s metaphysics, reason is a cause. You are asking why, so any cause 
is also, metaphysically, a reason. Everything, moreover, has to be considered in 
thought. Cause is a logical term and so means more than simply efficient cause. 
This means that God too, like all existing things, is subject to the causal question, 
but for Descartes this amounts to asking why God does not need a cause. God is 
not a caused being in the ordinary sense, but there is a reason (in God‘s immense 
power) why God does not require a cause. This link between premise and thing is 
what makes it easier for Descartes to argue that causes are necessarily linked to 
their effects—as Hume would later realize. 
God‘s existence follows from the fact that it is contained in the ―true and 
immutable essence, nature, or form‖ of a supremely perfect being, just as it 
follows from the essence of a triangle that its angles equal two right angles. 
Unlike Anselm, who starts from the infinite nature of God, Descartes agrees with 
Aquinas that the idea of supreme perfection follows only after a process of 
deductive reason. Although it seems, he says, that we can consider God‘s essence 
apart from His existence, as Aquinas suggested, we have to realize that when we 
pay sufficient attention to the idea of God ―existence belongs to its essence‖—
―necessarily belongs‖ in the French version: ―For what is more self-evident than 
the fact that the supreme being exists, or that God, to whose essence alone 
existence belongs, [French version: ―in the idea of whom alone necessary and 
eternal existence is comprised‖] exists?‖71 
So though the main purpose of Meditation Five is to lay the groundwork 
for a mathematico-mechanical science of nature (the essence of material things 
consists simply in extension and extension is described by geometry and 
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mathematics), in fact, Descartes argues, once we realize this we also have to 
realize that the knowledge of God has to be considered as higher and more 
certain than our knowledge of extension. Even those who would reject the 
argument for God‘s existence in Meditation Three, but who would nonetheless 
accept the validity of geometrical and mathematical demonstrations, would have 
to grant that the existence of God is known as clearly and distinctly as any 
proposition of mathematics or geometry. Mathematical and geometrical 
demonstrations start off with the idea of extension and then proceed to deduce 
things about this idea by drawing out the content of the idea and what that 
content entails. Each step in the proof is legitimate because it rests on a clear and 
distinct perception either of the nature of extension or of some consequence 
which immediately follows from this nature. If you are going to allow that 
knowledge can be obtained in this way, then you must accept as a principle that 
whatever can be learned by clear and distinct perception of the content and 
consequences of an idea must be true—otherwise we could not rely on 
geometrical demonstrations. But if this principle is accepted then you must 
accept the existence of God just as you accept the truths of geometry and 
mathematics, because the ontological proof for God‘s existence proceeds in the 
same way. The necessary existence of God is thus derived by deduction from the 
content of the idea of an all perfect being.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Both Curley and Marion have recently questioned the coherence of Descartes‘s 
concept of Divinity, though to different ends.72 The details of their arguments 
would take us too far afield here, so it must suffice to say that both of their 
positions arise out of what are really neo-Platonist and voluntarist difficulties 
with the nature of God‘s unified power. Problems with this concept arise only if 
we assume that the concept of God is a wholly discursive one, so that the concept 
of unity would be seen merely as a collection of attributes.73 In reply to this the 
neo-Platonists tended towards a non-discursive via negativa, while the 
voluntarists attempted to solve the problems of compossibility by making subtle 
distinctions between the absolute and ordained powers of God.74 Both traditions 
provide an important background to Descartes‘s work.  
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Both Anselm and Descartes obviously think that there is something about 
the concept of God that is discursive, and that it is possible to discuss God‘s 
nature. In both cases God is transcendent and is argued to be such.75 Descartes, 
however, thinks he has improved on Anselm‘s description of the nature of God 
by focusing on God‘s infinite causal power, thus using the principle of perfection 
to deal with the problem of infinity in a positive way, showing that the concept of 
God as causa sui is not self-defeating and thereby overcoming Anselm‘s via 
negativa. In the infinite power of God all perfections are one: God is wholly just, 
and wholly merciful. Infinite justice is the same as infinite mercy (just as an 
infinite circle coincides with an infinite line), yet they are conceptually, or 
formally, distinct. Quod rem God‘s justice and mercy are one. The conceptual 
distinction only implies a certain non-identity (as opposed to a separation), and 
this non-identity is grounded in the formal realities to which the distinction 
applies.  
Ultimately, however, God‘s nature is a discursive concept only to us. We 
know God only finitely. Only on the level of finite differentiation can we 
distinguish God‘s attributes. This may present problems for us, but not for the 
unity of God itself. So, in the end, both Anselm and Descartes abrogate 
discursive reason in their ontological arguments and rely for their idea of God on 
an intuition. In Anselm, as we saw in the first section of the paper, this intuition 
is negative; in Descartes, however, the intuition is positive. For Descartes, 
recognizing God in an act of intuition guarantees His existence because this is to 
―recollect‖ him as an idea indistinguishable from its cause. God must be thought 
of as the positive ground of all creation. As Descartes points out to Caterus: ―But 
as regards God, if I were not overwhelmed by philosophical prejudices, and if the 
images of things perceived by the senses did not besiege my thought on every 
side, I would certainly acknowledge him sooner and more easily than anything 
else. For what is more manifest than the fact that the supreme being exists, or that 
God, to whose essence alone existence belongs, exists?‖76 Insofar as Descartes‘s 
ontological argument tries to explain this intuition of God it is a ―causal‖ 
argument.  
The centrality and innateness of the causal principle is thus the key to 
understanding Descartes‘s ontological proof and its placing in the Meditations. 
Descartes, self-conscious about the structure of his argument and the writerly 
requirements of his task, clearly highlights the turn from reflective to recollective 
innateness right at the beginning of Meditation Five, where God‘s causal relation 
to himself is said to follow deductively and innately from his very nature: God‘s 
existence belongs to his essence. So despite his insistence on preserving God‘s 
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incomprehensibility, Descartes arrived at a positive notion of God by making a 
distinction between formal and efficient causality that preserved the universality 
of the causal principle: causality does apply to God, especially in so far as God 
and His attributes can be understood distinctly, but only in terms of formal 
causality, which is analogous to efficient causality but is not the same thing. This 
allows us to understand the place of the ontological argument in the Meditations 
and adds a further strand to the complementarity of Meditations Three and Five.77 
God as a perfect and necessary being is recollected as the formal cause of his 
own reality, which is why we can ask for an explanation even of Him. As 
Descartes argues, this idea of God is the most positive, clear, and distinct idea we 
have, and its truth is the foundation of the truth of all others: everything depends 
on God and the fact that he is no deceiver.78 For Descartes, God is the positive 
ground of all existence and truth. 
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